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THE BROKEN COMMITMENT: A MODERN
VIEW OF THE MORTGAGE
LENDER'S REMEDY*
Daniel C. Drapert
Today, large, long-term mortgage lending is becoming increasingly sophisticated. Major transactions, often involving millions of
dollars, move in carefully orchestrated sequences from the issuance
of a loan commitment by the lending institution to the loan closing.
Since 1951, however, the Federal Reserve Board's attempts to curb
inflation have caused unusual fluctuations in interest rates and thus
have subjected mortgage commitments to stress in times of falling
rates.' The fact that the actual conduct of business rather than the
reported cases evidences this stress hardly makes it any less real.
When a borrower breaches his original commitment for a large,
long-term loan at high rates in order to close the loan with another
lender at a lower rate, the interest rate differential may involve
hundreds of thousands of dollars in present money damages even
after discounting to reflect future payments. 2 Yet institutional
lenders, partly for reasons of reputation and partly because of
uncertainty as to the remedies available upon breach of a commitment, have generally turned to out-of-court settlements, rather
than litigation, as the means of vindicating their rights.
Some measure of protection against breach is provided if the
borrower is using the permanent loan to "take out" or refinance a
construction loan 3 by means of a three-party "buy-sell" agreement
among the construction lender, permanent lender, and the bor* I am indebted to Messrs. Thomas Moseley, Earl H. Nemser, and Eric Ranney for
their assistance in the preparation of this Article and to A. W. Roberts, Esq., for providing
material from a parallel study.
t Member of the New York Bar. Chairman, Banking Committee of the New York
County Lawyers Association and member of the Committee on Real Property of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. B.A. 1940, M.A. 1941, West Virginia
University; LL.B. 1947, Harvard University.
Quarterly Economic Report, 32 THE MORTGAGE BANKER 24B (1972); see 58 FED. RES.
BULL. A-9-10, A-34-35, A-53 (1972) (detailed summary of recent fluctuations in lending
rates).
' See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.

3 Construction financing is interim, short-term financing for the construction period
under which the funds are usually advanced based on architect's certificates or other
certificates as the work proceeds. Permanent financing is financing on completed construction on a long-term basis. As to the relationship between the two, see Draper, Permanent
Mortgage Financing-The Shopping Center, in REAL ESTATE FINANCING CONTEMPORARY TECH-

NIQUES 200-02 (C. Goldstein, program director 1973).
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rower. As a prerequisite to lending, construction lenders often
require that a borrower procure a commitment for permanent
financing in order to fund on a long-term basis the short-term
construction loan. In substance, the permanent lender agrees to
refinance for the benefit of the construction lender, and the construction lender agrees to deliver the loan for the benefit of the
permanent lender. However, such an agreement furnishes only
some assurance that the loan will in fact be delivered to the
permanent lender, for the construction lender, which is often the
borrower's bank of deposit, may, at its customer's request (presumably backed up by an indemnity), attempt to avoid its obligation.
Moreover, even though the borrower demonstrates his willingness
to assume certain obligations by his execution of the documents, he
may feel less compelled to honor them than in other situations
because the buy-sell agreement is "for the mutual benefit of the
construction lender and the permanent lender, and not for the
benefit of the borrower. '4 The use of devices such as refundable
fee and liquidated damage provisions in the commitment itself 5
and other remedies 6 has thus far proved similarly ineffectual in
procuring borrower performance in stress situations. Specific performance would provide the institutional lender with a more certain remedy than damages even though it might necessitate a court
compelling the borrower to execute loan documents and to close.
Lenders fear that courts would balk at awarding extremely large
sums as damages for the breach of a purely executory loan commitment which in some commercial circles or, perhaps more accurately, in the practice of some borrowers, is somehow regarded as
4 Melody, Protecting Loan Commitments, 33 THE MORTGAGE BANKER 28, 42 (1973).

5 See notes 25-36 and accompanying text infra.
' For example, a lender may file a lispendens in an action "in which the judgment
demanded would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment, of real property."
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 6501 (McKinney 1963); see CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 409 (West 1973).
The claim for specific enforcement of the contract for a loan and mortgage probably meets
this requirement. See J. Henry Small Realty Co. v. Strauss, 162 App. Div. 658, 147 N.Y.S.
478 (2d Dep't 1914). The tide report of a second potential lender would show, as a title
exception, the lis
pendens of the first lender, which would cause most second lenders to refuse
to make the loan. Of course, the is pendens may be bonded by the borrower pursuant to
statute, cancelled of record, and the title exception thereby removed.
The owner of the realty may move for cancellation of the notice. The court may cancel
the notice if the plaintiff's action is not commenced or prosecuted in good faith. N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 6514(a)-(b) (1963). The courts also have the inherent power to cancel the notice
when it is filed in an improper case. See, e.g., Braunston v. Anchorage Woods, Inc., 10
N.Y.2d 302, 222 N.Y.S.2d 316, 178 N.E.2d 717 (1961) (action to abate nuisance found not to
affect title, possession, use or enjoyment of property; lis
pendens cancelled). See also Chappelle
v. Gross, 26 App. Div. 2d 340, 274 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1st Dep't 1966) (plaintiff made out prima
facie case when lis
pendens filed in bad faith).
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not legally binding. 7 Furthermore, in order to prove damages, the
going rate for comparable loans at the time of breach must be
established. Although this concept is clear, the determination of the
figure may present difficult problems of proof, particularly in the
case of large loans for which comparable transactions from which
evidence may be drawn are not readily available.
Clearly, the defaulting borrower should not be left free to
accept or reject a valid contract as his economic conscience dictates.
Nor should the courts effectively provide him with this freedom by
dismissing an aggrieved lender's complaint for equitable relief on
the ground that the lender's remedy at law is adequate, when in
fact it is at best highly uncertain.8 Today's procedural system,
which fuses law and equity, should provide more imaginative
solutions. One possible approach would be for the trial court to
retain jurisdiction to grant equitable relief, but submit the issue of
damages to the jury and then give the defendant the right to elect
either damages or specific performance.
The availability of a reliable legal remedy reinforces any commercial transaction. Due to the length of the construction period in
many cases, a year may pass between the time the commitment is
signed and the loan is closed. In these transactions, the modern
long-term mortgage lender must commit itself to making a loan
with the sober realization that extensive negotiations incident to the
preparation and signing of the loan agreement may yield him only
legal uncertainty and disappointed expectations if interest rates
decline prior to closing and the borrower refuses to accept the
agreed rate. The primary sources of this uncertainty are twofold:
First, Rogers v. Challis,9 a nineteenth century case widely followed in
the United States, 10 supports the proposition that equity will not
See text accompanying notes 25-29 infra.
8 Sie text accompanying notes 37-43 infra.
27 Beav. 175, 54 Eng. Rep. 68 (Ch. 1859).
0 Although exhaustive research has failed to disclose a single American case in which a
lender has sued for specific performance, there are instances in which Rogers was invoked to
deny a borrower's suit for specific performance. See, e.g., Kent v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 349
F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1965); Leach v. Fuller, 65 Colo. 68, 173 P. 427 (1918); Hixson v. First
Nat'l Bank, 198 Ia. 942, 200 N.W. 710 (1924); Kenner v. Slidell Say. & Homestead Ass'n,
170 La. 547, 128 So. 475 (1930); Conklin v. People's Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 41 N.J. Eq. 20, 2 A.
615 (1886); Bradford, Eldred & Cuba R.R. v. New York, L.E.&W.R.R., 123 N.Y. 316, 25
N.E. 499 (1890); Norwood v. Crowder, 177 N.C. 469, 99 S.E. 345 (1919); Steward v.
Bounds, 167 Wash. 554, 9 P.2d 1112 (1932); Gideon v. Putnam Dev. Co., 113 W. Va. 200,
167 S.E. 140 (1932); see Magee v. McManus, 70 Cal. 553, 12 P. 451 (1886) (sembe); Beal v.
United Properties Co., 46 Cal. App. 287, 189 P. 346 (1920) (semble); Cohn v. Mitchell, 115 Ill.
124, 3 N.E. 420 (1885); Hall v. First Natl Bank, 173 Mass. 16, 53 N.E. 154 (1899). See also
Annot., 41 A.L.R. 357 (1926).

1974]

LENDER'S REMEDIES

grant the specific performance of an executory contract to lend
money, even though the loan is to be secured by an interest in real
property. Second, the paucity of case law on the subject of monetary damages for the borrower's breach makes legal action by the
lender an uncertain proposition.
This Article analyzes the adequacy of remedies presently available to an aggrieved lender when a borrower refuses to close at the
agreed rate in order to demonstrate that the law of monetary
damages for a borrower's breach is not sufficiently developed to
provide an "adequate remedy at law" that can be invoked to deny
specific performance. As will be shown, the dynamics of modern
mortgage lending in certain instances clearly require specific performance, and not damages, as the appropriate remedy. Because
few, if any, American cases deal directly with the lender's
problem," and because the treatises 1 2 merely refer back to Rogers
v. Challis'3 without analysis, this hoary British case must first be
examined in some detail to determine the extent to which its major
underpinnings remain viable. The particular problems which the
ascertainment of money damages pose will then be described.
Finally, the possibility of the lender obtaining specific performance
of the loan to be secured by an interest in real property is explored,
with specific attention paid to those reasons which are still advanced to deny the lender this remedy.

I
THE RULE OF

Rogers v. Challis

The Rogers rule has been summarized as follows: "That specific
performance of a contract to lend money cannot be enforced is so
well established, and obviously so wholesome a rule, that it would
be idle to say a word about it."'1 4 Like many fixed principles which
come to govern difficult and complex situations, this rule had its
origins in a simple case. By two letters of December 17 and 18,
1859, the plaintiff Rogers agreed to loan the defendant Challis
£1000, repayable in four monthly installments, with ten percent
interest to be paid in advance. As security for the loan, four items
were enumerated: a bill of sale of certain furniture and other
"

12

See note 10 supra.
See, e.g., 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1152 (1964); E. FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE §

54 (6th ed. 1921); 49 AM. JUR.Specific Performance§ 86 (1943); 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance§
80 (1953).
13 27 Beav. 175, 54 Eng. Rep. 68 (Ch. 1859).
14 South African Territories, Ltd. v. Wallington, [1898] A.C. 309, 318.
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personal property, a bill for the first installment, a guaranty against
the removal of the property specified in the bill of sale, and "a
deposit of the lease of Webb's Hotel, Piccadilly, and of the assignment
1 5
of it, which had been made to Challis."'
Before any money passed

hands, the defendant found better terms elsewhere, contracting for
a loan of £1000 with one Mr. Reddish. Upon the defendant's
refusal to accept his funds, Rogers brought a suit in equity to
compel specific performance and asked, in the alternative, for
monetary damages. Subsequent to the commencement of the action, but prior to judgment, the second loan was consummated.
In dismissing the plaintiffs complaint, the Master of the Rolls
based his conclusions on two grounds. First, he emphasized that,
should relief be granted, an avalanche of such litigation would
ensue because any oral agreement to lend money, however casual,
could conceivably give rise to a lawsuit. The Master reached this
result by first stating the issue before him in simplified fashion:
The case cannot be put higher than this:-that the Defendant
applies to the Plaintiff for the loan of 1,0001. upon a security
which he specifies, and the Plaintiff assents to the proposal, but
on the next day the Defendant says, "I have changed my mind, I
do not require your 1,0001., I can get it on better terms elsewhere." Is that a case in which a person can come to this Court
for a specific performance, and say, "you, the Defendant,
are
1' 6
bound to let me advance . . . the money to you?'
The Master found no difficulty in answering his question in the
negative, concluding:
It is very justly said that, the Statute of Frauds does not apply to
such a case; therefore, if the Court has jurisdiction in such a case,
any conversation may be made the subject of a suit for specific

performance: thus if two friends are walking together, and one
says, "will you lend me 1001., at 51. per cent, for a year upon
good security," and the other says "I will," that conversation
might be made the subject of a suit for specific performance in
this Court, if on the next day one friend should say "I do not
want the money," or the other should say "I will not lend it."
Nothing would be more difficult and more dangerous than the
task which this Court would have to
perform, if it were to
7
investigate cases of that description.1
13 27 Beav. at 175, 54 Eng. Rep. at 68.
16 Id. at 177-78, 54 Eng. Rep. at 69.
17 Id. at 178, 54 Eng. Rep. at 69 (emphasis added). Although it may be a purely
academic point, the Master of the Rolls left some doubt as to whether his statement on the
British Statute of Fraud's inapplicability refers to the specific facts of Rogers in which an
assignment of a hotel lease was offered as security or whether the remarks simply pertained
to the general case in which B agrees to borrow Z 1000 from A. If no interest in land were
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As a practical matter, the fear which this argument expresses
amounts to little more than a tempest in a teapot with respect to
modern mortgage lending transactions in which every step in a
given transaction is reduced to writing.' 8 Such loans are simply not
offered as security, the fact that the contract was for the loan of money would not in and of
itself have brought the agreement within the British Statute of Frauds, which remained
unchanged from 1676 through 1859. See 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 17, at 386 (1676). Although an
argument might be made that the lending of money is within the "sale of goods" section of
the Statute, the term "goods" was never construed to include money. 29 H. HALSBURY, LAwS
OF ENGLAND § 9 (2d ed. 1938); see Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 62, at 369 (1893)
(incorporates sales of goods provision in 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 17, at 386 (1676) and expressly
excludes "money"). The fact that both British statutes deliberately omit "chose in action"
precludes the argument that lending money is within the Statute as a sale of a chose. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-105(1), Comment 1, 2-201. On the other hand, a mere
agreement to loan money may come within the Statute of Frauds if it cannot be performed
within one year. See Hoagland, Allum & Co. v. Allan-Norman Holding Corp., 228 App. Div.
133, 239 N.Y.S. 291 (1st Dep't 1930).
In deciding whether the facts of Rogers fit within the Statute of Frauds in 1859, it must
be recognized that these facts are somewhat ambiguously stated. First, the two letters
through which the parties concluded the transaction may have contained a memorandum of
the agreement sufficient to satisfy the Statute. If such were the case, then the Master's
pronouncement is nothing but dictum. Second, it is not clear whether Challis was the
assignee of the lessor's interest or the lessee's interest in the Webb Hotel. Either view is
plausible. If Challis was the lessor's assignee, Rogers's security would be based on the rent
paid by the lessee of the hotel. If Challis was the lessee's assignee, Rogers's interest would be
secured by the rent which all the occupants of the Hotel paid the lessee. This ambiguity is
further complicated by the fact that Challis was the second assignee of the interest in
question.
If Challis was the assignee of the Lessee's interest, which seems more likely since Rogers
wanted a deposit of the lease as well as its assignment, then it is reasonably certain that the
agreement was within the Statute of Frauds. First, the lease of a building does constitute an
interest in "lands, tenements or hereditaments," within the meaning of 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4, at
385 (1676). See Horsey v. Graham, [1869] L.R. 5 C.P. 9; 27 H. HALSBURY, supra § 1070. See
also Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c, 20, § 62, at 601 (amending earlier statute by
deleting "tenements and hereditaments" and defining "land" to include "buildings"). Second, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 3, at 385 (1676) requires that the assignment of a lease be in writing.
If, on the other hand, Challis was the assignee of the lessor's interest, it is probable that
the agreement would also come within the Statute of Frauds because the landlord's rent had
been held to constitute an "interest in land" within the meaning of 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § 4, at 385
(1676). Re Whitting, Ex parte Hall, [1879] 10 Ch. D. 615; see Gorringe v. Land Improvement
Soc'y, [1899] 1 Ir. R. 142. Since the Whitting decision came subsequent toRogers, it is possible
that the right to receive rent was viewed as a chose in action and therefore not within the
Statute.
Finally, it should be noted that the subsequent British cases brought by borrowers
seeking specific performance involved adequate writings, and the policy advanced by the
Master of the Rolls was not relied upon. See South African Territories, Ltd. v. Wallington,
[1898] A.C. 309; Larios v. Bonany y Guerty, [1873] L.R. 5 P.C. 346; Western Wagon &
Property Co. v. West, [1892 1 Ch. 271; Sichel v. Mosenthal, 30 Beav. 371, 54 Eng. Rep. 932
(Ch. 1862). See also Gorringe v. Land Improvement Soc'y, supra.
18 But see Sintenis, Current Treatment of the Non-Refundable Commitment Fee and Related
Problems, 86 BANKING LAw J. 590, 597-603 (1969) (examples given of careless practice which
rendered written commitments unenforceable through omission of material terms).
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the result of a casual conversation or correspondence between two
acquaintances. Furthermore, it is settled law that an agreement to
loan money secured by a mortgage on real property does constitute
a contract for the sale of an "interest in land" within the meaning
9
of the Statute of Frauds and therefore must be in writing.'
Second, the Master suggested that the legal remedy available
to the plaintiff would be quite adequate because the suit was really
a simple money demand; the Plaintiff says, I have sustained a
pecuniary loss by my money remaining idle, and by my not
getting so good an investment for it as you contracted to give me.
This is a mere matter of calculation, and a jury would easily
assess the amount of the damage which Plaintiff has sustained.20
However, the Master expressly declined to voice an opinion as to
whether an action at law for breach of contract could be brought in
such a case, concluding that the statute2 which conferred upon
Chancery jurisdiction to assess damages required that the court
have before it a valid claim for equitable relief.2 2 In short, the
Master of the Rolls conveniently avoided fashioning a remedy for
the plaintiff, leaving him no other alternative but to file an action
for damages at law. Modern procedure, of course, would not
permit such a disposition of the lender's complaint.
Not only are the facts in Rogers far removed from the world of
modern mortgage lending, but the court also reveals a view of
credit transactions which bears little resemblance to current
financial practice. The Master of the Rolls described the contract
before him as follows:
This is not an agreement to purchase or sell anything, it is
not the case of a contract to buy a particular debt upon certain
terms, or a contract for the purchase of a certain quantity of
goods, to be paid for by installments and in a particular manner,
in which case the Court has held, that these were circumstances
which took the transactions out of the rule of this Court, that an
ordinary contract for the sale or purchase of goods is not the
proper subject of a suit for specific performance in this Court. It
19 Driver v. Broad, [1893] 1 Q.B. 744; Brizick v. Manners, 9 Mod. Rep. 284, 88 Eng.
Rep. 454 (Ch. 1742). Articulating the principle in Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N.Y. 69, 72, 142
N.E. 355, 356 (1923), Judge Cardozo stated:
One who promises to make another the owner of a lien or charge upon land,
promises to make him the owner of an interest in land, and this is equivalent in
effect to a promise to sell him such an interest.
For a recent case illustrating this proposition, see Lambert v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
481 S.W.2d 770 (Fenn. 1972), noted in 39 LEG. BULL. 56 (1973).
20 27 Beav. at 179, 54 Eng. Rep. at 70.
21 The Chancery Amendment Act, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 27, § 2 (1858).
22 27 Beav. at 179, 54 Eng. Rep. at 69.
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is nothing more than this:-a proposal to borrow a certain sum
of money, upon certain terms, for a certain time, which is
accepted, and the borrower says two or three days afterwards, I
do not23want the money, and I have got it elsewhere, upon better
terms.

Today, the right to borrow money at certain terms, like a
"call," represents a commodity which is sold; furthermore, the
judgments involved in a lender's decision to grant a mortgage loan
to a particular borrower involve more subtle and complex factors

than a casual agreement between private individuals. Moreover,
Rogers itself represents a case in which fluctuations in the interest
rate played no role in the defendant's decision to breach the loan
contract; indeed, the decision came at a time (1859) when the
doctrine of laissez-faire predominated in political economy, and
government intervention affecting interest rates was minimal.2 4
Although borrowers generally have been successful in enforcing commitments against lenders,2 5 borrowers often take the
position 26 that commitments, even though obligatory in form with
respect to them,2 7 should not bind them because the bargaining
position between borrower and lender is unbalanced. These borrowers argue that commitment fees constitute the "price" for their
• Id. at 178, 54 Eng. Rep. at 69.
24 Before leaving Rogers, it is interesting to note that at least two prior British cases
indicated a somewhat contrary view. In Bass v. Clively, 1 Tamlyn 80 (1829), 48 Eng. Rep. 33
(Ch. 1829), the defendant agreed in writing to borrow £3000 for five years, giving as
security a mortgage on her five leasehold properties subject to the plaintiffs inspection of
the fee title to those properties. This inspection, the plaintiff averred, had been denied by
the defendant. The defendant's bill denied that any such condition had been agreed upon
and maintained that the defendant was at all times willing and ready to carry out the
agreement. By the time of the trial, the plaintiff had already paid over £600 to the
defendant and had received a mortgage on one of the leaseholds.
The court accepted the facts as stated in the defendant's bill, noting that the plaintiff
could only obtain specific performance of the agreement as proved. Although the court
entered a decree ordering the performance of this agreement, the defendant recovered costs
against the plaintiff. This particular fact undermines whatever value Bass might have as
authority for the proposition that a lender can compel specific performance. Also, the
contract here was not executory £600 had already been advanced. At most the case held
that specific performance will lie to complete a partially performed loan. Rogers distinguishes
Bass on the basis of defendant's consent to the performance. Rogers v. Challis, 27 Beav. 175,
177 n.(b), 54 Eng. Rep. 68, 69 n.(1) (Ch. 1859). See Hunter v. Langford, 2 Molloy 272 (Ch.
1828) (semble).
25 See notes 32 & 50 infra.
26 Letter from Stephen Hochberg, Esq., General Counsel, Lefrak Corp. to Earl H.
Nemser, Esq., April 2, 1973 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
27 An example of an obligatory clause follows: "The Loan, which by your acceptance of
this commitment you agree to accept from us[,] shall be in the amount of ...
" Draper,
Permanent Mortgage Financing-The Shopping Center, in REAL ESTATE FINANCING 21), 119
(1972).
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"option" to call down the loan and are retained by the lender; but
research discloses no case law treatment of this argument. Borrowers further argue that the lender's commitment conditions mean,
in substance, that the borrower is unable to enforce the contract
against the lender. However, in light of the competition in the
national money market among lending institutions for large loans,
the bargaining is not in fact unbalanced, 28 and it is only with
respect to the large loan that the broken commitment problem is
serious for the lender. Well represented borrowers, moreover,
preclear title conditions, leases, and other documents, thereby
eliminating many of the lender's conditions, and in the case of new
construction, construction lenders usually require such preclearance.
Finally, borrowers and lenders have a well established practice
of paying additional charges for what is known as a "standby"
(optional) commitment under which, by the terms of the commitment, the borrower is not obligated to borrow. 2 9 The existence of
the "standby" device, for which the borrower pays additional consideration, supports the view that commitments which are obligatory by their terms are obligatory at law.

II
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF A CONTRACT To LOAN
MONEY

Although Rogers based its decision to deny specific performance, at least in part, upon the availability of a remedy for
damages, research has failed to disclose a single case, either in the
United States30 or in Britain 3 1 which actually grants such a
28 There are 490 savings banks in the United States, the largest concentration of which
is located in the northeastern United States. In New York (see N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235(6)
(McKinney 1971)) and in most other states, savings banks are authorized to invest in
conventional mortgage investments nationwide.
29 See Draper, supra note 3, at 178.
20 Cf. Federal Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Burnstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923).
In Central Mortgage Co. v. Partello, 132 N.Y.S. 432, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1911), the court stated by
way of dictum:
Conceding, without deciding, that the delendant may have been apprised of
the fact that plaintiff was accepting the loan for itself, and that defendant agreed to
borrow the money from the plaintiff, the damages which plaintiff suffered are the
loss of profit which it would have made if the defendant had carried out its
agreement.
"1 See J. MAYNE & H. MCGREGOR, ON DAMAGES (Common Law Library No. 9, 13th ed.
1973).
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remedy. 3 2 The only area in which a lender's damages have been
recognized judicially lies in the field of commitment fees. 33
Borrowers pay commitment fees at the time they sign the
commitment. A nonrefundable fee is consideration to the lender
for the issuance of the commitment. Such a fee should not, of
course, be applied toward damages, for it represents interest over
and above the stated rate which the lender is, by the terms of the
commitment, entitled to keep. A refundable commitment fee is
designed to assure the lender that the borrower will perform. Some
commitments explicitly provide that refundable commitment fees
are liquidated damages. In Boston Road Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association,34 for example, the provision for a fee stated that, should the borrower fail to comply
"with all the terms and conditions herein... without fault on our
part, then the amount so paid as consideration for our agreements shall be retained by us in full satisfaction for our entering
32 A substantial body of case law does exist involving suits by borrowers against breaching
lenders. See Annot., 44 A.L.R. 1486 (1926); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 1408 (1925). Indeed, this is the
only aspect of damages with which the treatises deal. See 1 B. CLARK, NEW YORK LAW OF
DAMAGES § 170 (1925); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 12, at § 1078; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK
LAW Damages § 695 (J. Fuchsberg, ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 343 (1932)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. In this context it is often stated that the borrower can
recover only nominal damages for the lender's breach. See, e.g., Avalon Constr. Corp. v.
Kirch Holding Co., 256 N.Y. 137, 175 N.E. 651 (1931); Bond Street Knitters, Inc. v.
Peninsula Nat'l Bank, 266 App. Div. 503, 42 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1st Dep't 1943). See also Turpie v.
Lowe, 114 Ind. 37, 15 N.E. 834 (1888). This view, however, has simply reflected the fact that
the aggrieved borrower could have obtained the money elsewhere at the same rate of
interest. In those cases in which the borrower has been compelled to pay a higher rate of
interest than that for which he had bargained, he has been allowed to obtain the present
value of the difference between the two rates. See, e.g., Hixson v. First Nat'l Bank, 198 Ia.
942, 200 N.W. 710 (1924); Weissenberger v. Central Acceptance Corp., 64 Ohio App. 398,
28 N.E.2d 794 (1940); Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planter's Bank & Trust Co., 135
Tenn. 208, 186 S.W. 92 (1916). The controversial issues in the area of lender breaches,
however, are what incidental and consequential damages a borrower may recover and
whether those damages were fairly within the contemplation of the parties. Compare Turpie
v. Lowe, supra, with Bond Street Knitters, Inc. v. Peninsula Natl Bank, supra. See also 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 12, at § 1078.
'3 See Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 459 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1972); Regional Enterprises, Inc. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America, 352 F.2d 768
(9th Cir. 1965); Pivot City Realty Co. v. State Say. & Trust Co., 88 Ind. App. 222, 162 N.E.
27 (1928); White Lakes Shopping Center, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 208 Kan.
121, 490 P.2d 609 (1971); Continental Assurance Co. v. Van Cleve Bldg. & Constr. Co., 260
S.W.2d 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Paley v. Barton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 82 N.J. Super. 75, 196
A.2d 682 (App. Div. 1964); Boston Road Shopping Center, Inc. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n of America, 13 App. Div. 2d 106, 213 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dep't 1961), affid, 11 N.Y.2d
831, 182 N.E.2d 116, 227 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1962). See also Sintenis, supra note 18, at 597-603;
Wolf, The Refundable Commitment Fee, 23 Bus. LAW. 1065 (1968).
3' 13 App. Div. 2d 106, 213 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dep't 1961), affd, 11 N.Y.2d 831, 182
N.E.2d 116, 227 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1962).
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this agreement and holding ourselves ready and willing to make
the loan within the aforesaid time,
and thereupon this agreement
'35
shall become null and void.
Although the court termed this provision a liquidated damages
clause, clearly a clause could be drafted providing that the refundable fee would be applied toward damages in the event of a breach
(not in full settlement but on account thereof) thus leaving the
parties to their proof.3 6 If the damages proved exceeded the
refundable fee, then the breaching party would have to pay the
difference, but if they were less than the fee, the lender would have
to refund the difference.
Apart from the difficulties that a lender may encounter in
attempting to protect himself by means of a commitment fee, the
actual calculation of damages involves certain complexities which a
hypothetical example will serve to illustrate. Assume, for the sake
of simplicity, a $10 million loan at 8 percent to be repaid in
installments over a ten-year period. Subsequent to the issuance of
the commitment letter, but prior to closing, the market rate of
interest drops to 7.5 percent. 37 Assume that the defaulting borrower takes out another loan at that new rate. Without discounting
to present value, it can be seen that the difference in interest
between what the lender would have obtained at 8 percent and
what he can now obtain at 7.5 percent is $500,000. With discounting at the contract rate, the difference is $335,500. Neither sum is
insubstantial, and one can imagine the natural reluctance of a court
to impose such damages on a defaulting borrower, particularly in
view of the rather casual way in which some of the mortgage
lending trade regards commitments.
The question of how to discount that figure to present value is
one that goes directly to the rationale behind contract damages.
Traditionally, in the event of a breach, courts have enforced
contracts by granting as damages the amount necessary to give the
nondefaulting party the "benefit of the bargain," i.e., to put him in
the position in which he would have been had there been no
35 Id. at 108, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 524. See Sintenis, supra note 18, at 604-12.
But see Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 459 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1972) (liquidated damages provision in commitment which also contained nonrefundable fee
sustained).
36 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 27, at 128-29; Melody, supra note 4, at 30.
37 Of course, it is not always possible to determine the exact extent of the market rate
drop for any equivalent loan. For this reason, it is difficult to determine what constitutes an
equivalent loan. See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
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breach. 38 To accomplish this, the discounting must be at the rate of
interest prevailing at the time of the breach, so that the amount
actually received as damages, when invested, will give the nondefaulting party the same return he would have received under the
contract.3 9 This highly speculative element hardly contributes to
the adequacy of the contractual remedy at law.
The problem is further compounded if the terms of the loan
permit the borrower to prepay in order to reduce his interest
burden. In the unlikely event the defaulting borrower demonstrates that by prepaying the loan in accordance with its terms 40 the
lender would have received less than if the loan had run its full
term, then that lesser amount, discounted as outlined above, would
be the proper measure of damages.
Other interesting and difficult problems also arise in connection with the calculation of damages. First, should the defaulting
borrower be allowed to prove that the particular business on which
he has based his application for a commitment would in fact be
unsuccessful so that the lender would not actually have received
the interest (or indeed the return of principal) as specified in the
commitment? Second, should the differential between market and
contract interest rates be awarded regardless of whether the aggrieved lender has in fact found an alternative borrower? If the
interest rate rises to its former level by the time trial of the dispute
begins the problem is further complicated. The defaulting borrower might then argue that the lender, as part of its duty to
mitigate damages, should have "ridden out" the interest rate
fluctuation by investing the money that he would have used for the

"sSee UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106(1); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970).
39 Superficially, the legal or judgment rate of interest, which governs the extent of
discounting future wages in actions, might seem appropriate. At the high rates of interest
currently prevailing in the marketplace, the lender would benefit from a windfall since the
damage award could be reinvested at a higher rate of return than the legal rate. In short, the
lender would be in a better financial position than he would have been had there been no
breach. In the case of a wrongful death award, the judgment rate may be justified on the
theory that it is impossible to determine at what rate the claimant will invest the money
received as damages. The judgment rate is meant, therefore, to foreclose arguments as to
how well the sum will be invested.
A closer analogy may be drawn from the income approach to valuation in condemnation
proceedings. There the object is to arrive at an appropriate amount as just compensation by
discounting to present value the projected future income of property. There is no one,
standardized method of discounting; the methods utilized generally attempt to determine
the market rate for such an investment.
" Along with a prepayment penalty, interest must be paid until prepayment is permitted (possibly five years or more).
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broken commitment on a short-term basis, awaiting a rise in
interest rates to the previous level. This argument overlooks the
obvious fact that an institutional mortgage lender fulfills its duty to
mitigate damages by acting as would a reasonable institutional mortgage lender in the circumstances. 4 1 Most of these institutions
naturally resist speculative ventures and are sometimes required by
law to refrain from speculating. 4 2 They must act cautiously and
invest available funds as best they can, usually in the best available
long-term investment. In any event, if the commitment contains a
clause stating that the measure of damages for a breach by the
borrower is the difference between the contract rate of interest
over the life of the loan and the rate for the same period prevailing
in the mortgage money market at the time of the breach, there is
43
no reason why the court should not honor such a provision.
It is apparent that several troublesome and as yet unresolved
questions remain concerning the issue of monetary damages. If
aggrieved lenders begin to sue upon broken commitments, the
courts will be compelled to face and resolve these issues. Only then
will it be possible to proclaim in any meaningful sense that a lender
should be denied specific performance because it possesses an
adequate remedy at law.
III
EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR THE LENDER

As far back as 1936, Professor Sydney Post Simpson surveyed
the course of American equity over the preceding fifty years and
concluded:
See Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 1183.
Investments for savings banks are limited in general to those relatively safe investments enumerated in section 235 of the Banking Law (N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235 (McKinney
197 1)), and savings banks are not generally permitted to enter into speculative contracts. See
Jemison v. Citizens Say. Bank, 122 N.Y. 135, 140 (1890).
4' An example of such a clause is:
It is understood and agreed that upon your failure to close the loan or any advance
thereunder hereby contemplated for reasons within your control, one of the
provable elements of damage sustained by us as a result of such failure shall be the
difference between (1) interest at the rate of _
% ... per annum herein specified
for the period from the date of expiration of this commitment to maturity and (2) a
sum equal to interest for the same period computed at the rate prevailing in the
mortgage money market at the time of your cancellation of this commitment or
your refusal to close hereunder. No credit against such damage shall be allowed for
any payments made to us by you in connection with this commitment except the
nonrefundable commitment fee as provided for [elsewhere herein].
Draper, supra note 27, at 136-37.
"

42
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The law of specific performance is substantially more liberal
and better adapted to the requirements ofjustice than it was fifty
years ago. There has been [an] increasing willingness to enforce
contracts not relating to land, a tendency which has been assisted
by statute, although some old and arbitraryrules, like that which denies
44
relief where the defendant has agreed to lend money, still persist.

In the thirty-eight years since that statement was made, specific
performance has become even more commonly granted and, in the
view of some commentators, it appears to be almost as available as
any other remedy. 4 5 In other words, the presumption against
equitable relief has substantially lessened.4 6 The Rogers rule has
yielded, in both Britain and the United States, when it has impeded
modern commercial practices; 47 but the cases which have undermined Rogers have usually involved suits by lenders. In South
African Territories, Ltd. v. Wallington,48 for example, the House of
Lords refused to compel the defendant to purchase the plaintiffs
mortgage bonds pursuant to an underwriting contract on the
grounds that such an agreement was merely a contract to lend
money. Parliament found the result untenable, however, and the
case was soon overruled by statute.4 9 In short, the value of specific

performance as a remedy which would ensure adequate relief for
the parties to an underwriting contract was found to outweigh any
need to sustain an inflexible rule about contracts to lend money.
Moreover, a notable erosion of what Simpson called the "old and
arbitrary rule" has occurred with respect to suits by borrowers.5 °
44 Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REv. 171, 172-73 (1936) (emphasis added).
45 Compare 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 12, at § 1136 (remedy of specific enforcement as
available as are other remedies), with E. MArrLAND, EqurrY-A COURSE OF LECTURES 304
(rev. ed. J. Brunyate 1936) (specific performance applies to agreements for sale or lease of
lands as matter of course; its application outside these limits somewhat exceptional and discretionary). Cf Leach v. Fuller, 65 Colo. 68, 173 P. 427 (1918).
46 See Simpson, supra note 44, at 173. For a very early expression ofjudicial support for
this position, see Phillips v. Berger, 2 Barb. 608, 610-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
47 See South African Territories, Ltd. v. Wallington, [1898] A.C. 309. See also Electric &
Eng'r Management Corp. v. United Power & Light Co.. 19 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1927); Busch
v. Stromberg-Carlson Tel. Mfg. Co., 217 F. 328 (8th Cir. 1914).
48 [1898] A.C. 309.

'9 "A contract with a company to take up and pay for any debentures of the company
may be enforced by an order for specific performance." Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20
Geo. 5, c. 23, § 76. The Companies (consolidation) Act of 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, § 105
contained a similar provision.
50 See, e.g., Southampton Wholesale Food Terminal, Inc. v. Providence Produce
Warehouse Co., 129 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1955) (exempts construction mortgages from
Rogers rules); Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Dominguez, 9 Ariz. App. 172, 450 P.2d 413 (1969);
Camden v. South Jersey Port Comm'n, 4 N.J. 357, 73 A.2d 55 (1950); Jacobson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 129 N.J. Eq. 440, 20 A.2d 19, affd, 130 N.J. Eq. 604, 23 A.2d 409 (1941); Caplin v.
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Recently, in Leben v. Nassau Savings & Loan Association,5 the New
York Appellate Division, Second Department, exercising equitable
jurisdiction, reformed the interest rate on a recorded mortgage at
the request of a borrower who had been forced to close at a rate
higher than that provided in the commitment. Given this trend
toward making equitable relief more freely available, especially in
underwriting cases, the question of whether a lender may obtain
the specific performance of a contract to lend money should no
longer be subject to the kind of wooden analysis which simply
disposes of the issue by citing the Rogers rule.
Assuming that damages are awarded on the basis of the
parties' expectancy, the money judgment may afford an aggrieved
lender a remedy substantially inferior to specific performance. In
short, relief at law could be inadequate 52 even for the breach of a
contract to loan money. Although no sure test has evolved for
determining whether and under what circumstances monetary
damages are inadequate, the Restatement of Contracts enumerates at
least two criteria in such an evaluation which are relevant to the
area of mortgage lending:
(a) the degree of difficulty and uncertainty in making an accurate
valuation of the subject matter involved, in determining the
effect of a breach, and in estimating the plaintiffs harm;
(c) the difficulty, inconvenience, or impossibility of obtaining a
duplicate or substantial equivalent of the promised performance
by means of money awarded as damages. 53
Both of these factors focus upon the degree of difficulty inherent
in substituting money damages for the promised performance. In
the mortgage commitment area, such problems arise in calculating
the precise monetary amount, as explored above, and making a
mere money judgment equivalent to what the defendant had
agreed to undertake.
This latter complication is particularly relevant in testing the
adequacy of a lerider's legal remedies. The interest rate which a
lending institution assigns a given borrower represents, within the
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 182 App. Div. 269, 169 N.Y.S. 756 (2d Dep't 1918); Columbus Club
v. Simons, 110 Okla. 48, 236 P. 12 (1925). See also Woodruff v. Germansky, 233 N.Y. 365
(1922); National Sur. Corp. v. Titan Constr. Corp., 26 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 260
App. Div. 911, 24 N.Y.S.2d 141, reargument denied, 260 App. Div. 923, 25 N.Y.S.2d 398
(1940).
"' 40 App. Div. 2d 830, 337 N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d Dep't 1972).
12 RESTATEMENT § 359.
53 Id. at § 361.
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limits set by the market, a judgment as to the stability, potential,
and risk involved in the particular transaction. Although such
assessments are routine in deciding whether to loan money to John
Doe instead of Richard Doe for the purpose of buying a house in
Levittown, the decision to loan millions of dollars for a given
54
commercial project represents a matter of some sophistication.
When the aggrieved lender seeks to obtain another borrower
subsequent to the breach of the first commitment, it is doubtful
whether the lender can obtain an identical investment or even an
equivalent opportunity. The original commitment represents the
best available arrangement in terms of risk at the given market
rate. Any other available project may present greater risks in
obtaining similar loan yields. Assuming that interest rates have
fallen below the original market rate, the lender cannot compensate himself for being forced to take on a riskier investment in
order to obtain similar loan yields. Monetary damages measured by
the difference between the commitment rate and the lower market
rate do not compensate the lender for the fact that the breach
might force the borrower to undertake a less desirable loan in
order to mitigate his damages. Thus, the right to receive interest at
an agreed rate from a loan, which, in the lender's judgment, is
uniquely favorable, may be worth more than the interest differential between that agreed upon rate and the lower market rate plus
the right to receive interest at that lower rate from a less favorable
project.
Put another way, from a bank's standpoint, 8 percent in a
shopping center with high credit leases may be superior to 7.5
percent plus an interest differential in another shopping center
with leases on inferior terms, inferior credits, or both. Although an
actual situation is unlikely to present such a clear-cut difference, 5 5
4 Cf. Walter E. Heiler & Co. v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 459 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.
1972). In the Heller case, the Second Circuit, in sustaining a liquidated damages clause
observed:
The variables inherent in a lender-borrower relationship arising out of the
borrower's need for funds to purchase a nine million dollar jet airplane are
numerous and uncertain. Such facts as rate of return, duration of the loan, risk,
extent and realizability of collateral, and the other obvious uncertainties inherent in
this particular contract combined to make it difficult to foresee, at the time the
contract was executed, the extent of damages which might arise from the breach of
the loan agreement.
Id. at 899-900. The same considerations apply with equal force to modern mortgage lending
on a whole range of projects from shopping centers to office buildings.
55 But see City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C.), affd per curiam 394
F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1967), noted in I I S. WILLISTON, supra note 32, at § 1424. In Ammerman,
specific performance of an option contract which gave the plaintiff the right to lease space in
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the lender should, at the very least, be able to argue the commercial uniqueness of his broken commitment as a basis for obtaining
56
specific performance.
Because a mortgage lender advances money largely on the
security of a mortgage in real property, the question that naturally
arises is whether a commitment comes within the rule, settled in
equity, that contracts to sell or purchase an interest in land are
specifically enforceable.5 7 To be avoided at the outset is the morass
of formalism which underlies any attempt to determine whether
what the mortgagee obtains actually constitutes an "interest in
land. '5 8 The weight of authority in the United States is that a
a shopping center was granted. The lower court emphasized factors relating to the plaintiff's
unique judgment of the value of the particular enterprise:
It is apparent from the nature of the contract involved in this case that even were it
possible to arrive at a precise measure of damages for breach of a contract to lease a
store in a shopping center for a long period of years-which it is not-money
damages would in no way compensate the plaintiff for loss of the right to
participate in the shopping center enterprise and for the almost incalculable future
advantages that might accrue to it as a result of extending its operations into the
suburbs.
Id. at 776. It is significant that the court also alludes to the "incalculable" advantage of
extending operations into a new area, in this case the suburbs. A similar element might well
be present in the mortgage lender's decision to commit for a permanent loan particularly in
those instances when, for example, the borrower is a shopping center for a new community.
56 Consideration of unique business judgment also constitutes the rationale for granting
specific performance to purchasers of securities which are available from particular vendors
only. See, e.g., Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 248 (D. Neb. 1972), affd,
473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).
5 See RESTATEMENT § 360. The Restatement of Contracts provides:
Damages are regarded as an inadequate remedy for the breach of a promise
(a) to transfer an interest in specific land, or
(b) to buy and pay for such an interest, so long as the transfer has not yet
been made ....
Id. A comparatively recent case, Russell v. Western Nebraska Rest Home, Inc., 180 Neb. 728,
732-33, 144 N.W.2d 728, 731-32 (1966), states the principle: "When land, or any interest
therein, is the subject matter of an agreement, the power of a court of equity to enforce
specific performance is beyond question."
" Although this problem in all its legal and historical ramifications lies beyond the
scope of this Article certain explanatory observations are necessary. One may, of course, be
tempted simply to agree with Professor McDougal: "A study of the tortuous course of
judicial decision could have been used to show that there are mortgages and mortgages and
natures and natures." McDougal, Book Review, 44 YALE L.J. 1278, 1279 (1935). For a
discussion'of the development of the mortgage in England, see G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§
1-12 (1970). At common law, the mortgagee held a fee simple title to the mortgaged
property subject only to the condition subsequent of the mortgagor paying off the underlying indebtedness. Equity, however, came to regard the transaction not as a conveyance of the
fee but merely as a security device. In the United States, the treatment of the mortgagee's
interest breaks down into three separate lines of judicial decisions which parallel the
difference between law and equity in England. See G. OSBORNE, supra at §§ 13-16. 4
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 16.13-.16 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 5 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF

REAL PROPERTY § 1380 (B. Jones ed. 1939). Under the "title theory," the mortgagee obtains a
fee simple title which entitles him to possession of the mortgaged premises, subject to
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mortgagee's interest is merely a lien on the mortgaged premises. 5 9
Clearly, a mortgagee does not intend to acquire the fee title to

property as does an actual purchaser. 60 The heart of the difference
between the lien theory and the title theory is the extent to which a

creditor should be able to exert control over the mortgaged property in order to protect its value as security. On the other hand, the

underlying rationale for the specific enforceability of contracts to
convey an interest in real property is the unique character of
land. 61 There is no logical reason, however, why land should be
considered unique for purposes of acquiring the fee but not for the
purpose of assessing it as security for a mortgage loan. 62 Theredefeasance in case of full payment by the mortgagor. Under the "lien theory," the mortgagee merely has a security interest in the mortgaged property, with no right to possession.
According to a third or "intermediate" theory, the mortgagee is entitled to possession but
only after default by the mortgagor.
This tripartite division constitutes an over-simplification because, apart from the question of possession, the decided cases do not always resolve the issues in a consistent manner.
Thus, to cite one example, it is uniformly held in both lien and title states that a judgment
creditor of the mortgagor can always obtain an execution against the mortgaged property
although a judgment creditor of the mortgagee cannot. See, Sturges & Clark, Legal Theory
and Real Property Mortgages, 37 YALE L.J. 691, 704-05 (1928). In fact, courts in certain
nominally "title theory" states have recognized the mortgagor's equitable rights to a degree
that, for all practical purposes, constitutes recognition of the "lien theory." G. OSBORNE,
supra at § 14. In Walker v. Wood, 31 Tenn. App. 196, 203, 213 S.W.2d 523, 526 (1948), the
court noted: "All mortgages ...howsoever drawn, are deemed in equity as mere securities,
notwithstanding any stipulations that title is to become absolute on certain conditions; and
such conveyances constitute mere liens and must be enforced as such." But see Lambert v.
Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 481 S.W.2d 770, 772-73 (Tenn. 1972) (mortgage commitment held agreement to transfer "an interest in land" for purposes of Statute of Frauds). See
also note 17 supra.
5" 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 16.14, 16.15 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); A. AXELROD, C.
BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 137 (1971). As pointed out above,

the question of whether a particular state is a lien or title state should be approached with
some circumspection (see note 58 supra); seven states, Alabama, Maine, Maryland, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont could arguably be called title states.
60 Of course, a conniving lender can use the mortgage as a means of acquiring the
debtor's property by lending him funds that he knows the debtor cannot repay.
6: Caveat: Although the decided cases have clearly articulated this rationale, the specific
enforceability of contracts to sell or purchase land is also grounded in the historical fact that
land has always occupied a predominant place in England and the United States. Row after
row of suburban plots can hardly be viewed as "unique," however. The element of
uniqueness seems more clearly present when property has been singled out for commercial
use, and that is precisely the kind of property which is offered as security to a mortgage
lender.
62 Southampton Wholesale Food Terminal, Inc. v. Providence Produce Warehouse Co.,
129 F. Supp. 663, 664 (D. Mass. 1955), recognizes this argument in connection with a suit by
a borrower:
Since the law regards land as unique an agreement to buy land can be specifically
enforced even though the defendant's sole obligation is to pay money [citation
omitted]. Although the question is close, it may not be too great a stretch to include
advances under a construction mortgage.
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fore, theories dealing with creditors' rights to protect the security
should not determine the unrelated question of when specific
enforcement should be granted.
Quite apart from the burden of proving the inadequacy of
damages, the lender seeking equitable relief encounters certain
other doctrines which have traditionally limited the availability of
specific performance. The concept of mutuality of remedy has
fallen into disrepute, 63 and it should pose no obstacle to a lender
who demonstrates his willingness to advance the funds in question
to the defendant borrower. 4 Although in the past equity has been
reluctant to compel successive performances and has shown a
certain sensitivity toward the problems of supervision and of possible hardship upon a defendant, recent decisions have departed
from this view.6 5
If the liberal trend toward granting equitable relief continues, lenders may at some
point be relieved of the necessity of fitting within the rubric of conveying an interest in land.
In Phillips v. Berger, 2 Barb. 608, 610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848) (emphasis added) this view was
suggested, the court stating:
The jurisdiction of this court, in compelling a specific performance of contracts
relating to lands, is pretty well settled; but not so in regard to personal contracts
-that is, contracts for personal acts, or for the sale and delivery of personal
property. The reason for the distinction between the two classes of contracts has long since
passed away. Yet the distinction still, in a measure, remains. Judge [sic] Story, with
great propriety, in his commentaries on equity jurisprudence, remarks, that there is
no reasonable objection to allowing the party who is injured by the breach to have
an election either to take damages at law, or to have a specific performance in
equity. The courts have not yet gone that length; but when they do, they will relieve the subject
of specific performance of many of its embarrassments, and remove from this branch of equity
jurisprudence many of the artificial distinctions to which the courts have been compelled to
have recourse in order to justify their advance toward such a sound general rule.
" See Pound, The Progress of the Law-Equity, 33 HARV. L. REV. 420, 432 (1920); cf.
Sichel v. Mosenthal, 30 Beav. 371, 54 Eng. Rep. 932 (1862).
64 In its purest form, the mutuality requirement denies specific performance to a
plaintiff if such a remedy is not available to the defendant. 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 32, at
§ 1433. The principle has been largely repudiated in most jurisdictions. Id. § 1440. What has
emerged in its place is summarized by Williston:
Specific enforcement may properly be refused if a substantial part of the agreed
exchange for the performance to be compelled is as yet unperformed and its
concurrent or future performance is not well [or sufficiently?] secured to the
satisfaction of the court.
Id.
65 See 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 12, at § 1171; cf Langson v. Goldberg, 298 Ill. App.
229, 18 N.E.2d 729 (1939). Problems of supervision are relevant not only to successive
advances by the lender but also to the periodic repayment by the borrower. Yet a court of
equity should be able to fashion a decree conditioning a borrower's obligation to accept an
advance upon its tender by the plaintiff. Furthermore, the difficulty of supervising successive repayments does not, on examination, appear insurmountable; the lender's counsel
should be more than happy to furnish periodic reports. One significant problem does exist.
In large mortgage transactions, the developer who signs a commitment is usually undertaking construction financed by a loan from another institution. If the borrower breaches his
commitment prior to the completion of this work, the lender could find himself in an
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On the other hand, although specific performance for the
lender might be considered a form of "equitable mortgage," this
particular doctrine generally has been limited to the proposition
that equity will grant a mortgage after the lender has advanced
money where either the legal formalities for imposing a mortgage
have not been met or the borrower simply refuses to execute a
mortgage in favor of the lender. 66 In practice then, this doctrine
would be valuable only to those rare lenders who had made
advances prior to the execution of a mortgage.
One final problem with specific performance is critical. Suppose the breaching borrower moves quickly and not only walks
away from his original commitment but actually closes a loan at the
lower market rate with another lending institution. Of course, if
the second lender induces this breach of contract it is liable in
damages to the original lender. 67 If the second lender knows of the
anomalous situation because the satisfactory termination of construction is usually a condition precedent to his obligation to advance funds and, conversely, to the borrower's
obligation to accept them. It is settled law that a party who prevents the occurrence of a
condition precedent is answerable in damages, but equity has been reluctant to require a
party to perform or complete construction. However, most breaches occur after the construction has been completed, the borrower using the interval to wait for a drop in the
market.
16 G. OSBORNE, supra note 58, at §§ 22-48.
17 The essential elements of an inducement cause of action are (1) the existence of a
valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party at the time of the defendant's alleged
inducement to breach, (2) the defendant's knowledge of that contract, (3) an intentional and
unjustified act by the defendant causing the third party to breach that contract, and (4)
damage to the plaintiff by the breach. See Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N.Y. 443, 447-48, 173
N.E. 674, 675 (1930). See also Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 99,
151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1956).
The most common form of commitment constitutes a contract to make a mortgage in
force between the dates of execution and closing of the loan. R. KRATOVIL, MODERN
MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 46 (1972). After the closing date has passed, the second
lender can run no risk of liability for acts which would normally be considered inducements
for breach, for, after that time the first agreement will have expired. See Winer v. Glaser, 3
App. Div. 2d 656, 158 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dep't 1957). Similarly, a recognized breach
occurring during the term of the commitment terminates the contractual relationship
between the borrower and the bank, thereby exonerating the second lender from inducement liability for conduct occurring after the breach is recognized. Thus, if the borrower
communicates a repudiation of his commitment to lenderA (see Forward Publications, Inc. v.
International Pictures, Inc., 277 App. Div. 846, 98 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1st Dep't 1950);
RESTATEMENT § 318) prior to the date of performance specified in the commitment, and
lender A recognizes this breach by initiating suit for damages against the borrower (see
Wester v. Casein Co., 206 N.Y. 506, 515, 100 N.E. 488, 491 (1912) (dictum); Mignon v.
Tuller Fabrics Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 174, 176, 148 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607-08 (lst Dep't 1956)
(dictum); Plunkett v. Comstock, Cheney Co., 211 App. Div. 737, 741, 208 N.Y.S. 93, 97 (1st
Dep't 1925)), lender B can thereafter negotiate with that borrower without concern for
inducement liability. However, the lender to which an anticipatory repudiation has been
communicated need not recognize the borrower's breach. Rather, the lender may merely
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prior commitment at the time it issues its commitment, even
though the second lender does not induce the breach of the first
commitment, the second lender should not be entitled, based on
general equitable principles, to-enforcement of its commitment.
The second lender may fairly be said to have knowingly assumed
the risk that the first commitment might be specifically enforced.
Accordingly, the second commitment would not conflict with the
specific enforcement of the first in these circumstances. The second
commitment presents a greater difficulty, however, when the second lender is unaware of the first commitment at the time it
commits. If the innocent second lender relies upon its commitment, to its substantial detriment, while the first lender suffers no
substantial detriment, presumably equity would favor the subsequent lender. 68 Likewise, if the first lender relies upon its commiturge performance of the borrower's obligation without waiving the breach (see RESTATEMENT
§ 320; cf. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-610(b) (McKinney 1964)) or may choose to waive the borrower's
breach altogether, keeping the contract in force and binding upon both parties. Hadfield v.
Colter, 188 App. Div. 563, 577, 177 N.Y.S. 382, 390 (1st Dep't 1919). Thus, unless lenderA
brings suit, it may well be impossible to ascertain whether or not the first lender has
recognized the borrower's breach. In such a case, if lender B engages in conduct constituting
an inducement to breach after the borrower's anticipatory repudiation it may be liable to
lender A in damages if it were later determined that lender A considered the agreement to
be in full force and effect.
A lender asserting an inducement cause of action against a second lender must establish
that the defendant had "actual knowledge" of the existing contract between the plaintiff and
its borrower. Roulette Records, Inc. v. Princess Prod. Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 335, 338, 224
N.Y.S.2d 204, 207 (1st Dep't), affd per curiam, 12 N.Y.2d 815, 187 N.E.2d 132, 236 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1962). Case law implies, but does not specifically state, that the defendant (lender B)
must have been aware that the third party (borrower) had contracted with the particular
plaintiff (lender A)-knowledge that the party induced to breach had an agreement with
someone is not enough. See State Enterprises, Inc. v. Southridge Coop., Inc., 18 App. Div.
2d 226, 283 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1st Dep't 1963). See also Gold Medal Farms, Inc. v. Rutland
County Coop. Creamery, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 473, 195 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dep't 1959). It is
clear, however, that, at least when lender A and lender B are competitors, knowledge of"the
detailed terms of the existing contract" is unnecessary (id.), and that the belief that a prior
contract, subsequently declared valid, was unenforceable is insufficient as an affirmative
defense (RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766, comment e (1938)).
The requirement that knowledge be "actual" has been literally construed. Thus, even
though the evidence indicates that a reasonable man should have known of the contract
(Roulette Records, Inc. v. Princess Prod. Corp., supra at 338, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 207) or that
the defendant evinced "a deliberate intent to stay in ignorance of what [he] suspect[ed]" (Id.
at 339, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (Steuer, J., dissenting)), there can be no recovery for inducement to breach. Moreover, the majority's discountenancing of the latter argument in Roulette
Records, strongly suggests that lender B is under no affirmative duty to inquire whether a
contract between the borrower and lender A is extant. Indeed, this is so even though it is
customary within the industry to inquire of the borrower whether he has existing contractual
obligations. See id.at 338, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 207. For a further discussion of the elements of an
inducement claim, see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1938).
68 Cf 5A A. CORBIN, supra note 12, § 1169.
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ment to its detriment while the second lender does not, equity
would favor the first lender. Finally, if both lenders suffer substantial detriment, or neither suffers any, then some equitable weight
should be given to the prior lender.6 9 In any event, to resolve these
cases the courts must strike a balance between the inadequacy of
legal damages on the one hand and the difficulty and hardship
involved in unscrambling the second transaction on the other.
CONCLUSION

The authority may be somewhat diffuse and obscure, but the
time is ripe for the courts to reinforce the certainty of large
commercial mortgage transactions by specifically enforcing commitments not only against lenders" ° but against borrowers as well.
" Where a party has contracted with two equally innocent purchasers for the
supply of special materials, the fact of priority in time of contracting may be given
some weight in enabling the earlier contractor to get a decree for specific performance or an injunction. Other factors, however, are entitled to much greater weight
than mere priority. If money damages would be a more nearly adequate remedy to
one buyer than to the other, this should be decisive as to which should be given
specific enforcement.
Id at 252 (emphasis added).
70 See Leben v. Nassau Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 App. Div. 2d 830, 337 N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d
Dep't 1972) (single family dwelling).

